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Abstract. In this paper we analyze urban spatial segregation phenomenon in terms of the
income distribution over a population, and inflationary parameter weighting the evolution of
housing prices. For this, we develop a discrete, spatially extended model based in a multi–agent
approach. In our model, the mobility of socioeconomic agents is driven only by the housing
prices. Agents exchange location in order to fit their status to the cost of their housing. On the
other hand, the price of a particular house changes depends on the status of its tenant, and on
the neighborhood mean lodging cost, weighted by a control parameter. The agent’s dynamics
converges to a spatially organized configuration, whose regularity we measured by using an
entropy–like indicator. With this simple model we found a nontrivial dependence of segregation
on both, the initial inequality of the socioeconomic agents and the inflationary parameter. In
this way we supply an explanatory model for the segregation–inequality thesis putted forward
by Douglas Massey.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 91D10, 91B72
1. Introduction
The spatial structure of a city is the result of a wide and complex set of factors. The way in
which different economic activities and social groups spread over the urban space is the matter of
different and complementary theories in Sociology, Geography, Politics and Economy [5, 9, 15, 34].
Housing patterns can be understood as the result of the complex interrelationship between individ-
uals’ actions constrained by social, political and economical rules [9, 36]. Residential segregation
is the degree to which two or more groups live separately from one to another in different parts
of the urban space [19, p. 282]. This phenomenon is concurrent to several social problems as the
concentration of low opportunities to get a well earned job, low scholar development in children
of segregated areas, premature parenthood between young people, and the emergence of criminal-
ity [21, 22].
Residential segregation has been the subject of extensive research in social sciences for many years.
It is a multifactorial phenomenon mainly determined by socioeconomic factors like race and income
distribution, as well as factors associated to the structure of the urban space [7, 13, 17, 21, 22].
There are two main quantitative approaches to segregation, the phenomenological one, which
relies on segregation measures and indexes [10, 12, 19, 23], and the theoretical one, based on
computational or mathematical models [3, 14, 25, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 30, 31, 32, 28].
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In this paper we propose a spatially extended model based in ideas of Portugali [28] and Schelling [30,
31, 32], to study the relationship between income inequality and residential segregation. The basic
thesis proposed by Massey and colleagues [21] is that the degree of spatial segregation experi-
enced by a society increases with its level of inequality. This relationship has been reformulate by
Morrison [24] as the segregation–inequality curve.
The organization of the article is as follows. In the next section we briefly expose the main
theoretical studies concerning the residential segregation, emphasizing only the ideas and concepts
that are relevant to our research. In section 3, we present the mathematical model and the tools
needed to analyze our numerical simulation, which we do in section 5. Previous to this, in section
4 we study of asymptotic behavior of the model, and derive some theoretical estimates which we
consider for the numerical study. Finally, we conclude with a discussion about the potential of our
model as an explanation tool.
2. The segregated city
Residential segregation is a complex phenomenon with several dimensions of analysis, whose gov-
erning mechanisms are hard to identify. In a first approximation we can however assume that the
phenomenon is governed by a set of structural and behavioral rules which determine the possibility
of one individual to get a particular kind of house in a specific location of the city. Since those
rules are no evident, simplifying hypotheses are required.
One point of view, based in human ecology, postulates that residential segregation occurs because
individuals in a city are in mutual competition for the space and its resources. According to
this approach, competition is the main force driving the residential segregation [9, p.86]. The
outcome of this competition is determined by the ability of individuals to struggle for advantageous
locations in the urban space, i.e. their dominant capacity, which is constrained by sociocultural
and socioeconomic rules [9, pp. 85–88].
There are three main hypothesis about the sociocultural rules governing the residential segregation.
The first one concerns with the class–selective emigration from poor regions. In a region where
coexist both poor and less poor people, the latter tend to emigrate to a more wealthy region. This
mechanism tends to isolate and concentrate poor people, increasing in this way the poverty rate
of the region. The second hypothesis establishes that neighborhood concentration of poor people
reflects the general poverty of the urban area. When the average shows a downward trend, neigh-
borhood poverty rates increase. Finally, the third is related the the racial segregation experienced
by poor people. Racial bias causes racial segmentation of the urban housing markets, which con-
curs with high rates of poverty in specific ethnic groups to concentrate poverty geographically [22,
pp. 426–428, and references therein]. These hypotheses are complementary, and were developed to
explain segregation in north–american cities, where they have been tested. Perhaps in the Latin–
american case racial and sociocultural factors have a less relevant role, making possible to build
an explicative model over socioeconomic considerations only.
Taking into account that “markets are not mere meetings between producers and consumers, whose
relations are ordered by the interpersonal laws of supply and demand” [15, p. 1], we can formulate
socioeconomic rules as market mechanisms. The housing market is formed by two kinds of agents:
residents which are interested in the social and individual value or use of the land commodity,
and the entrepreneurs which are interested in the exchange value of the land. There is a natural
conflict between these two of valuations of land.
There is a set of structural factors that are relevant to housing market dynamics: a) the house-
building industry; b) the government’s housing policy; c) the structure of the property of land;
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Figure 1. Segregation–inequality curve according to Morrison et al. [24]
d) the actual spatial structure of city, i.e. location of labor area, residential areas, and trade–
commerce areas; and e) the income structure of the society. The last one has been considered as
the most significant for the residential segregation phenomenon. Indeed, Urban Economic theory
explains the formation of segregated cities through two main arguments. The first one establishes
that a population of households with heterogeneous income competing for the occupation of urban
land traditionally results in an income–based stratification of the urban space according to the
distance to the city center [1]. The second one links the concentration of low incomes households
in some areas, to the existence of local externalities like ethnicity. As a consequence of this, there
is a households’ preference to live in relative homogeneous neighborhoods with respect to either
income or ethnic similarity [2, 4, 32].
Two levels of analysis may be considered in the study of residential segregation. At the macro
level, several structural transformations in the society (changes in income level, tendency to racial
exclusion, levels of social integration, etc.) are assumed to determine the spatial concentration of
poverty. This is the level of analysis in [7, 13, 16, 22]. At the micro level, specific discriminatory
individual behaviors related individual characteristics (sex, age, religion, ethnic group, nationality,
etc.) influence the choice of a place to live. This is the point of view in [6, 28, 27, 30, 31, 32], and
it is also the one we adopt here.
Our model was developed with the purpose of studying Massey’s thesis [21, p. 400], which re-
lates the degree of spatial segregation experienced by a society, to its inequality degree (income
disparity). This thesis was reformulated as the segregation–inequality curve (see Figure 1) by Mor-
rison [24]. More precisely, we intend to determine the relationship between these two quantifiable
phenomena, inequality and segregation, in a situation where the whole dynamics is governed basic
rules of socioeconomic nature.
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3. Model Structure
Our model is inspired in the works of Schelling [30, 31] and Portugali et. al [28]. Like Portugali’s
models, the physical infrastructure of our “simplified city” is modeled by a two–dimensional lattice
of finite size Λm,n = {1, 2, . . . ,m}×{1, 2, . . . , n}. A two–dimensional integer vector x = (x1,x2) ∈
Λm,n represent spatial coordinates. At each time step, the price of the house at location x is a
positive real number. Each house is occupied by a householders or agent, who can be distinguished
only by his/her socioeconomic status. We quantify this status with a real number taking one of
three possible values p < m < r (which stands for poor, middle class, and rich respectively). At
time t, each agent occupies one specific house of the city. Houses are identical in their characteristics
but differentiable by their prices.
There are two main mechanism setting up the house’s prices dynamics: the neighborhood influence,
and the householder’s economic status. On the other hand, the agents change position subject to
availability, under the pressure of their housing situation. Agents can move inside the city to
achieve an optimal match between their status and the price of the house they inhabit. Agents try
to live in houses with prices, but not too much, that their economic status.
At time t, the prices of houses are encoded in am×n matrix V t := (V t(x))x∈Λm,n , while the spatial
distribution of agents is stored in a m×n matrix At := (At(x))x∈Λm,n with values in {p, c, r}. The
price of that house at time t+ 1 is given by:
(1) V t+1(x) = At+1(x) + λ
∑
|x(1)−y(1)|+|x(2)−y(2)|≤2 V
t(y)
#{y ∈ Λm,n : |x(1)− y(1)|+ |x(2)− y(2)| ≤ 2}
The parameter λ weights the influence of the mean price on the neighborhood over the house price,
and can be thought as an inflationary parameter: the larger λ the higher the asymptotic mean
value of the houses in the city.
The distribution of the agents at time t+ 1 differs from its distribution at time t only by a single
place exchange between two agents of different status, i. e., at time t we randomly choose two sites
x,y ∈ Λm,n and define
(2) δ(x,y) :=
(
At(x)− V t(x))2 − (At(y)− V t(x))2 + (At(y)− V t(y))2 − (At(x)− V t(y))2 .
This quantity should be interpreted as the economic improvement due to the house exchange
between agents a locations x and y. At each unite time, only two agents can participate in such a
house exchange. We have At+1(z) = At(z) for z 6∈ {x,y} and
(3) At+1(x) =
{
At(y) if δ(x,y) > 0,
At(x) otherwise,
and similarly for y. The economic improvement due to a house exchange leads to the reduction
on the economic tension
(4) T (A, V ) = |A− V | :=
√ ∑
x∈Λm,n
(A(x)− V (x))2.
Agents try to minimize economic tension generated by difference between housing price and status.
In our model this difference plays the same role as the dissatisfaction or the unhappiness in the
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3.1. Analytical Tools. The segregation–inequality curve gives the relation between two charac-
teristics of the system: inequality and segregation. The income distribution can be interpreted
as a probability vector. The proportions of the population in each income group would be the
probability for an individual to belong to that income group. With this idea, income inequality
can be measure by using Theil’s inequality index [35, pp. 91–96]. Adapting this index to our
situation, we define inequality of a m× n agents’ distribution A as follows:
(5) I(A) = log(3) +
∑
i=p,m,r
qi log (qi) ,
where for i = p,m, r, qi = #{x ∈ Λm,n : A(x) = i}/(m × n) is the proportion of agents in
each income group. The inequality so defined is an entropy–like indicator taking values in the
interval [0, log(3)]. The minimum I corresponds to the case where the total population is equally
distributed among all the income groups, and maximum to the limit case of a single income group
concentrating the whole population. This last limit would be obtained from distributions where a
given income group includes most of the population.
The other characteristic we need to determine the segregation curve is the spatial segregation itself.
Though measures of segregation have been the subject of several works in sociology [18, p. 283
and references therein], it is more suitable to our approach to quantify this characteristic by using
the degree of order of a given spatial distribution. The idea is to associate the maximum degree
of order to a spatial distribution which can be easily described, like a single cluster or a periodic
distribution. On the other hand, a random distribution would have a low degree of order. We
use an image segmentation technique, the bi–orthogonal decomposition, to associate a degree of
disorder (the entropy of the bi–orthogonal decomposition), to a given spatial distribution which we
treat as an image [8, p. 131]. Thus, to quantify the segregation (ordering) of the city, we compare
the entropy of the bi–orthogonal decomposition of the ordered distribution with that corresponding
to a random distribution.
The bi–orthogonal decomposition is the bi–dimensional generalization of the Karhunen–Loe`ve
transform, but with the advantage that it is sensible to changes in the spatial structure of one
image. To a bi–orthogonal decomposition it is associate an entropy, which measures the amount
of information of the image [8, p. 133]. The interpretation is that in an orderer image, i. e. an in–
homogeneous distribution of pixels showing a spatial pattern, has low entropy, while to a random
distribution of pixels corresponds highest entropy.
Consider a m × n positive matrix U , which is supposed to codify an image or a two–dimensional
distribution. The associate covariance matrix Q := U †U is symmetric, and hence its eigenvalues
{λi : i = 1, . . . ,m} are real, and the corresponding eigenvectors {φi : i = 1, . . . ,m} define an
orthonormal basis. The bi–orthogonal decomposition allows us to rewrite the matrix U as,
(6) U =
m∑
i=1
ψiφ
†
i ,
where ψi = Uφi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. The contribution of the submatrix ψiφ
†
i to the sum is of the
order of the corresponding eigenvalue |λi|. The information of the matrix U is concentrate in the
submatrices associated to eigenvalues with the highest absolute value. For positive U , we neglect
the largest eigenvalue λ1, which can be associated to an spatially homogeneous mode. Using the
eigenvalue structure of the bi–orthogonal decomposition, we define the information contents of U
by
(7) HBO(U) = −
m∑
i=2
pi ln pi
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where
(8) pi =
|λi|∑m
k=2 |λi|
.
For an agent distribution A, the segregation index is
(9) SBO(A) = E(HBO)−HBO(A),
where E(HBO) is the expected value of HBO with respect to a random distribution of agents in
the m × n–dimensional lattice. We have numerically found that E(HBO) ≈ log(3/5 ×min(m,n))
for min(m,n) ≤ 1000.
4. Asymptotic behavior of the model
In order to understand the asymptotic behavior of the model, let us rewrite (1) and(3) in matrix
form as follows:
V t+1 = At + λDV t(10)
At+1 = P tAt(11)
Where both V t and At have to be considered as m × n–dimensional vectors, D is the averaging
matrix whose action is defined by (1), and P t is a permutation matrix which permutes at most two
coordinates. If for the chosen coordinates x,y ∈ Λm,n we have δ(x,y) > 0, then P t is the matrix
permuting those coordinates, otherwise P t is the identity matrix.
After a sufficiently large number of iterations, name T , the agents achieve a spatial distribution
A∗ which cannot be improved. From that point on, the distribution of housing prices follows the
affine evolution V T+t = A∗ + λDV T+t−1, so that
(12) V T+t = (λD)tV T +
(
t−1∑
s=0
(λD)s
)
A∗ = (λD)tV T +
(
Id− (λD)t) (Id− λD)−1A∗.
The long–term distribution of housing prices is therefore V ∗ := (Id− λD)−1A∗, so that the eco-
nomic tension associate to the asymptotic distribution of agents is
(13) T ∗(A∗) := T (A∗, V ∗) = |A∗ − (Id− λD)−1A∗| = λ× | (Id− λD)−1 (DA∗)|.
Because of the non–deterministic nature of the evolution of our system, the asymptotic distribution
A∗ is not uniquely determined by initial conditions. Nevertheless, it has to satisfy the following
“variational principle”
(14) T ∗(A∗) = min
P
∣∣∣(P − (Id− λD)−1)A∗∣∣∣ ,
where the minimum is taken over the set of all two–sites permutations. This is equivalent to say
that asymptotically no location exchange can diminish the economic tension.
4.1. Critical λ. For λ small, a spatially disordered initial distribution of agents A0 remains un-
changed, and the system evolves following an affine law, converging to A∗ = A0, V ∗ = (Id −
λD)−1)A0. For each spatially disordered initial distribution A0, there exists a critical value λc for
which A0 evolves towards an spatially organized state A∗. This distribution is composed by rela-
tively small number of clusters, each one of them consisting of a nucleus of rich agents surrounded
by middle class ones, while the lower class agents occupy the space left by the clusters. In our
numerical experiments, which we describe below, we have found that λc essentially depends on the
proportion of r, m, and p in A0.
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A two sites permutation A∗ 7→ PA∗ produces a change in the economic tension
T ∗(A∗) 7→ |λ (Id− λD)−1(DA∗) + (A∗ − PA∗)|.
According to Equation (14), this change does not make the economic tension to decrease. In order
for this to be so, it is necessary that
(15) |PA∗ −A∗|2 ≥ 2λ((Id− λD)−1(DA), PA∗ −A∗),
for each two sites permutation A∗ 7→ PA∗. We may decompose DA∗ = A∗ 1+ f , as the sum of a
constant vector and a fluctuating one. Since
(Id− λD)−11 = 1
1− λ
and (1, PA∗ −A∗) = 0, then Equation (15) can be written as
|PA∗ −A∗|2 ≥ 2λ((Id− λD)−1f, PA∗ −A∗).
Taking this into account, we may define λc as,
(16) λc = min
{
λ > 0 :
1
2
< max
P
λ ((Id− λD)−1f, PA∗ − A∗)
|PA∗ − A∗|2
}
,
where the maximum is taken over the two–sites permutations. For P interchange coordinates x,y,
we have,
(17)
λ ((Id− λD)−1f, PA∗ −A∗)
|PA∗ −A∗|2 ≡
((Id− λD)−1f)x − ((Id− λD)−1f)y
2(A∗
y
−A∗
x
)
.
4.2. An a priori estimate for λc. A reasonably good estimate for λc can be obtained as fol-
lows. Considering A∗ as a random field, the Central Limit Theorem ensures that, with very high
probability DA∗
x
∈ [A∗ − 2σ˜, A∗ + 2σ˜], where
σ˜ =
1√
N
√
E((A∗
x
−A∗)2).
Here N is the number of sites in the computation of the local mean DA∗
x
, which in our case is 25.
Hence, with very high probability,
max
x,y
|fx − fy| = 4σ˜ = 4
5
√
ρr(r −A∗)2 + ρm(m−A∗)2 + ρp(p−A∗)2,
where ρr, ρm, ρp are the proportions of r,m and p in A
∗ respectively. By using the upper bound
max
x,y
|((Id − λD)−1f)x − ((Id − λD)−1f)y| . maxx,y |fx − fy|
1− λ ,
we obtain
max
P
λ ((Id− λD)−1f, PA∗ −A∗)
|PA∗ −A∗|2 .
λ
1− λ ×
2
√
ρr(r −A∗)2 + ρm(m−A∗)2 + ρp(p−A∗)2
5 (m− p) .
According to Eq. (16), for λ ≥ λc we have
1
2
<
λ
1− λ ×
2
√
ρr(r −A∗)2 + ρm(m−A∗)2 + ρp(p−A∗)2
5 (m− p) .
Taking this into account, we propose
(18) λ∗ :=
5 (m− p)
4
√
ρr(r −A∗)2 + ρm(m−A∗)2 + ρp(p−A∗)2 + 5 (m− p)
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as an estimate for λc.
4.3. An priori estimate for SBO(A
∗) at λc. Suppose that A
∗ is composed by Nc clusters of
comparable size, and suppose also that all of them are symmetric with respect to the coordinate
axes. In this case A∗ has a cluster decomposition
(19) A∗ :=
Nc∑
i=1
QiP
†
i ,
where QiP
†
i corresponds to the i-th cluster. The vectors Pi and Qi have a belled form with
maximal value at coordinates where the cluster is located. The vectors {Pi}Nci=1 span a vector
space of dimension nc ≤ Nc, for which {pk}nck=1 is an orthonormal bases obtained from {Pi}Nci=1 by
the Gram–Schmidt process. Using this orthonormal base, we can rewrite A∗ :=
∑nc
k=1 qkp
†
ki
, where
the vectors qk are obtained form Qi after the change of basis. With respect to this new basis, A
∗
can be considered a random nc dimensional matrix, therefore HBO(A
∗) ≈ log(2 ∗nc/3), and hence
(20) SBO(A
∗) ≈ log(min(m,n)/nc).
Let Nmin be the cardinality of the less numerous class of agents, i. e.,
Nmin = min
i=p,m,r
#{x ∈ Λm,n : A∗(x) = i}.
For small values of the inequality index, i. e., for large Nmin, we have numerically found that
nc ≈
√
Nmin. This is consistent with an agents’ distribution A
∗ formed by Nc ∝ Nmin clusters, each
cluster containing nearly the same number of agents of the less numerous class. The corresponding
cluster decomposition would be obtained from a collection {Qi}n1i=1 of n1 ∝
√
Nmin bell shaped
vectors, and another collection {Pj}n2j=1 of n2 ≈
√
Nmin nearly orthonormal bell shaped vectors, as
A∗ =
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
QiP
†
j ,
In this case we have Nc = n1 × n2 ∝ Nmin, and nc = n2 ≈
√
Nmin. Hence, for low values of the
inequality index I, we may expect
(21) SBO(A
∗) ≈ S∗ := log(min(m,n)/
√
Nmin).
Note that Nmin does not determine the value of I. If this value is large enough, the variability of
Nmin inside the collection of agents’ distributions with the same I value produces a large dispersion
in S∗. For this reason it is not possible to define S∗ as a function of I, therefore there is not a
unique inequality–segregation curve.
5. Numerical Results
We performed a set of numerical experiments in the n × n lattice, for n = 64 and 128. Each
lattice node represents a house location in our virtual city, where agents and values of houses are
distributed. At time t, theses distributions are codified by n×n real valued matrices. The agent’s
matrix At takes only three values, r = 1, m = 1/2 and p = 1/10, representing the income of
rich, middle class and poor agents respectively. The distribution of house prices V t is a positive
matrix, which at time t = 0 takes values in the interval [0, 1]. Both spatial distributions, V t and
At, evolve interrelatedly according to Eqs. (1) and (3). The unevenness of an agent’s distribution
A is measured by using Theil’s index I(A) defined in Eq. (5). Since this indicator depends only
on the proportions of rich, middle class and poor agents, then I(At) = I(A0) for all t ≥ 0.
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Modeling the demographic composition of a city in a developing country, we have considered
“demographic scenarios”, i. e., a given number Np of poor, Nm of middle class, and Nr of rich
agents Nr, such that Nr < Nm < Np. In order to obtain an inequality–segregation curve, we have
chosen a one parameter family of demographic scenarios where Np increases from half to the total
population, while the ratio α = Nr/Nm < 1 is kept constant. In this way we obtain the family of
demographic scenarios
Fα := {(Np, Nm, Nr) ≃ (ηn2, (1− α)(1 − η)n2, α(1 − η)n2) : 1/2 < 1},
which we call “regular”. In our numerical simulation we found no qualitative difference among
different regular families. Instead, we have contrasted the behavior shown by Fα, with that of
the family of demographic scenarios obtained as follows: for each value of I we choose, among the
demographic scenarios with this inequality index, the most probable one subject to the condition
Np < Nm < Nr. For this we first consider the uniform distribution in {(Np, Nm, Nr) : 1 ≤ Ni ≤
n3, i = p,m, r}, then under conditions ∑i=p,m,r Ni = n3, Np < Nm < Nr, and I(A∗) = I, we
distinguish the most probable one with respect to the conditional probability distribution. In this
way we obtain a family Fmp of demographic scenarios which we call “most probable”.
For the regular family and for each lattice size n = 64 and 128, we have considered 10 different
demographic scenarios. The demographic scenario thus determines the value of the inequality
index I. These demographic scenarios have been chosen in order to have 10 nearly equally spaced
values for I in the interval of possible values [Iα, log(3)]. Note how the minimum possible value
Iα := log(3) + 1/2 log(1/2) + α/2 log(α/2) + (1 − α)/2 log((1 − α)/2), depends on the parameter
α of the regular family. Now, for each demographic scenario we have chosen 5 different values for
the parameter λ around our estimate λ∗. Once fixed the demographic scenario and the value of
λ, we performed 20 experiments in both, the 64 × 64 and the 128× 128–lattices. The purpose of
these experiments was: 1) to determine λc and compared it to our estimate; and 2) to compute
the value of the segregation index at λ = λc. By doing so, we were able to determine a functional
relation between the inequality index and the segregation index, which allows us to draw the
segregation–inequality curve. The same experimental protocol was implemented for the family of
most probable scenarios. In this case we produce 9 demographic scenarios, corresponding to 9
equally spaced values of I in the interval [0, log(3)].
Each experiment started with spatial distributions V 0 and A0 randomly generated. The entries of
V 0 were always taken independent and uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1], while for A0 the
agents determining a given demographic scenario were randomly distributed in the lattice. The
experiment consisted in the iteration of the evolution rule, Eqs. (1) and (3), until a stationary
distribution A∗ was reached. In Figure 2 we show the asymptotic distributions of agents A∗, ob-
tained from the same initial condition A0 by using 4 different values of λ. Note how the asymptotic
distribution acquires a more regular structure as we increase λ.
In order to determine λc, for a given initial agents’ distribution A
0, we compute the evolution of the
bi–orthogonal decomposition entropy HBO(A
t), considering increasing values of λ. If λ is small,
HBO(A
t) remains practically constant along the evolution, while for sufficiently large values of λ,
this entropy undergoes a monotonous decreasing until a definite time that we call segregation time,
at which it attains its limiting value. We illustrate this in Figure 3, where we show HBO(A
t) for
λ < λc and λ > λc. Hence, the segregation time may be considered infinite for small values of λ,
and taking finite values for λ ≥ λc. We determine λc corresponding to a initial agents’ distribution
A0, by computing HBO(A
t) for λ = λ∗ − 0.05, λ∗, . . . , λ∗ + 0.15, and taking the smallest of these
values for which segregation time is smaller than the empirically determined convergence time.
The time T an initial configuration A0 needs to attain the asymptotic distribution A∗, increases
with both I(A0) and λ. Nevertheless, for the 64× 64–lattice and λ < 1, this time never exceeded
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Figure 2. Asymptotic agent’s distribution for different values of λ in the 64×64–
lattice. Here I(A∗) ≈ 0.25 and λc ≈ 0.6
1200 iteration in our simulations. For the 128×128–lattice, this convergence time at λc was always
smaller than 2000, and never exceeded 3200 for the other values of λ. The convergence time T
appears to increase in proportion to n log(n), where n is the lattice size.
In Figure 4 we show the behavior of λc as the inequality index changes, for the regular family in
the 64× 64–lattice, and we compare it to the behavior of our a priori estimate λ∗. In Figure 5 we
display the same comparison for to the 128×128–lattice. Since λ∗ depends only on the proportions
of rich, middle class and poor agents, it is lattice size independent. According to our numerical
results, our a priori estimate is a reasonably tight lower bound for λc. Let us remark that the
numerical value of λc slightly depends on the initial condition of the experiment, hence we plot
the mean value of λc and the corresponding error bars.
For the family Fmp, we show in figures 6 and 7 the behavior of λc as a function of the inequality
index, in the 64 × 64 and 128 × 128–lattices respectively. We compare this to the behavior of
our a priori estimate λ∗. Since λc slightly depends on the initial condition, we show λc with the
corresponding error bars. Once again, λ∗ is a reasonably tight lower bound for the actual value of
λc.
In figures 8 and 9 we plot the segregation index SBO as function of the inequality index, for
the regular family in the 64 × 64 and 128 × 128–lattices respectively. These are the inequality–
segregation curves our model produces. We compare those curves to our a priori upper bound
estimate S∗ := log(n/
√
Nr) with n = 64 and 128, which we derived at the end of Section 4. In
figures 10 and 11 we plot the same data, corresponding to the family of most probable demographic
scenarios. Our numerical results show that, in the case of the regular family, our prediction holds
A SPATIALLY EXTENDED MODEL FOR RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION 11
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
Iterations
H
BO
Figure 3. Evolution of the segregation index HBO(A
t). We show two exper-
iments in the 64 × 64–lattice, for an agents’ distribution with inequality index
I = 0.5 and λ∗ ≈ 0.68. The green horizontal line corresponds to λ = 0.65, the
blue line was computed with λ = 0.75, and the red was obtained using λ = 0.8.
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Figure 4. In red λc with its error bars, also as function of Theil’s inequality
index I. In blue λ∗ also as a function of I. Both curves correspond to the regular
family, with α = 0.4, in the 64× 64–lattice.
for inequality indices in the interval 0 ≤ I ≤ 0.5. For the family of the most probable demographic
scenarios, the a priori upper bound holds up to I = 0.7. The exact value of SBO(A
∗) depends on
the initial condition A0, therefore we show its mean value with the corresponding error bars.
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Figure 5. In red λc, with its error bars, as function of Theil’s index I. In blue
λ∗ also as a function of I. Both curves correspond to the the regular family, with
α = 0.4, in the 128× 128–lattice.
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Figure 6. In red λc with its error bars, as a function of I. In blue λ
∗ also as a
function of Theil’s inequality index I. Both curves correspond to the the family
Fmp in the 64× 64–lattice.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
The model proposed here is intended as a tool towards the explanation of the well–known and
accepted thesis of Massey about the relationship between income inequality and spatial distribution
of individuals in a city. Build upon basic rules governing the dynamics of house prices and house
holders, this model is able to produce spatial patterns whose degree of order grows with the
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Figure 7. In red λc with its error bars, as a function of Theil’s inequality index
I. In blue λ∗ also as a function of I. Both curves correspond to the family Fmp
in the 128× 128–lattice.
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Figure 8. In red the segregation index SBO with its error bars, as function of I.
In blue S∗ = log(64/
√
Nr) also as a function of I. These inequality–segregation
curves correspond the Fα family, with α = 0.40, in the 64× 64–lattice.
income inequality of the virtual city. Thus we have a mathematical model of segregation, showing
a behavior in accordance to the Massey’s thesis. This model introduces a control parameter which
we relate to the adjustments of the house prices during the evolution, in a way that segregation
occurs only for large enough values of this parameter.
The model does not use a sophisticated housing prices theory, but simple interaction rules similar to
those proposed by Portugali and Benenson. Regardless to its validity inside the economic theory,
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Figure 9. In red the inequality–segregation curve, SBO as function of I. Here the
segregation index SBO is plotted with its error bars. In blue S
∗ = log(128/
√
Nr)
also as a function of I. Both curves correspond to the Fα family, with α = 0.40,
in the 128× 128–lattice.
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Figure 10. In red the segregation index SBO, with the respective error bars, as
function of I. In blue S∗ = log(64/
√
Nr) as a function of Theil’s inequality index
I. Both curves correspond the Fmp family in the64× 64–lattice.
we believe this is a good first approximation for the housing prices dynamics. The mechanism
responsible for the segregation is a location exchange process similar the one proposed by Schelling.
This process is driven by the economic tension resulting from the difference between the “economic
power” of the house holders and prices of the houses they occupy.
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Figure 11. In red the segregation index SBO, with the respective error bars,
as function of Theil’s inequality index I. In blue S∗ = log(128/
√
Nr) also as a
function I. Both curves correspond to the Fmp family in the 128× 128–lattice.
Though our model retains many of the Schelling’s ideas, the main difference is nature of the location
exchange decision. In Schelling’s original model, this decision is taken based on a satisfaction
function that takes in account the number of neighbors of the same kind around a given agent. In
our case, an agent decides to exchange is location according to the difference between its income
and the price of its house. We think that this is a more realistic situation in the sense that that
economic tension can be measure in real life. This mechanism is also better suited for a model of
a society where ethnic differences are less determinant than differences imposed by the income.
From the theoretical point of view, the model is interesting by its own. It exhibits an order–disorder
phase transition via clustering produced from a very simple exchange mechanism. It also appears
to present some finite size scaling behavior which would be pertinent to further explore.
Concerning the indicators we use, Theil’s is a widely accepted inequality index, with the advantage
that it is easy to compute and has a direct interpretation. Our segregation index, on the other hand,
have never been used in this context. Besides this indicator, we previously tried other entropy–like
measures of the degree of order in a spatial distribution, as well as some direct clustering measures.
We chose the entropy of the bi–orthogonal decomposition because it is almost as easy to compute
as the Theil’s index, and it has a natural interpretation as the information contents of a picture.
We are convinced that other segregation measures commonly used in the sociological literature are
no suited for our purposes, mainly because they are built from a previous organization of the data,
e. g., the census tracks. In our case, the structuration of the urban space is a result only of the
location exchange dynamics.
Summarizing, our model is built from a very simple location exchange rule, based on interaction
between agents through an economic tension produced by the difference between the agents’ eco-
nomic capacity and the prices of the houses they occupy. This simple mechanism is sufficient to
produce spatial segregation in accordance to Massey’s thesis: segregation is an increasing function
of the inequality. With this we were able to furnish key components of an explanatory model of
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spatial segregation in a situation where the economic factors are more significant than either ethnic
or cultural ones.
References
[1] Alonso, W. Location and Land Use, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1964.
[2] Benabou, R. (1993). “Workings of a City: Location, Education, and Production”, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 108 No. 3: (Aug.,1993),
[3] Benenson, I. “Multi–agent simulations of residential dynamics in the city”, Computer, Environment and Urban
Systems, Vol. 22, No. 1. (1998), pp. 25-42.
[4] Borjas G. “Ethnicity, neighborhood and human-capital externalities”, American Economic Review, Vol. 85,
No. 3.(Jun, 1995), pp. 365-390.
[5] Bourne, L.S. “Urban structure and Land Use Decisions”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers,
Vol. 66, No. 4. (Dec., 1976), pp. 531–547.
[6] Clark, W.A.V. “Residential Preferences and Neighborhood Racial Segregation:A Test of the Schelling Segrega-
tion Model”, Demography. Vol. 28, No. 1. (Feb., 1991), pp. 1-19.
[7] Cloutier, N.R. “Urban residential segregation and black income”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.
64, No. 2. (May, 1982), pp. 282-288.
[8] Dente, J.A., Vilela–Mendes, R., Lambert, A. & Lima, R. “The bi-orthogonal decomposition in image processing:
Signal analysis and texture segmentation”. Signal Processing: Image Communication 8. (1996) pp. 131-148.
[9] Duncan, T. The urban mosaic: Towards a theory of residential differentiation. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1971.
[10] Duncan, O. D. and Duncan, B. “A methodological analysis of segregation indexes”, American Sociological
Review, Vol. 20, No. 2. (Apr. 1955), 210-217.
[11] Farley, Reynolds, et al, 1979, “Barriers to the Racial Integration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit Case”, Annals
of the American Academy 441: 97.
[12] James, D.R. and Taeuber, K.E. (1985) “Measures of segregation”, Sociological Methodology, Vo. 15, 1-32.
[13] Jargoswky, P.A. “Take the money and run: Economic Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas”. American
Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 6. (Dec., 1996), pp. 984-998.
[14] Lieberson, S. and Carter, D.K. “A model for inferring the voluntary and involuntary causes of residential
segregation”, Demography, Vol. 19, No. 4. (Nov., 1982), pp. 511-526.
[15] Logan, J.R., and Molotch, H.L. Urban fortunes: The political economy of place, Berkeley, University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1987.
[16] Massey, D.S. and Fisher, M.J. “How segregation concentrates poverty”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 23,
No.4. (2000), pp. 670-691.
[17] Massey, D.S. “Effects of socioeconomic factors on the residential segregation of blacks and Spanish Americans
in U.S. urbanized areas”. American Sociological Review, Vol. 44, No. 6. (Dec., 1979), pp. 1015-1022.
[18] Massey, D.S. and Denton, N.A. “Spatial assimilation as a socioeconomic outcome”, American Sociological
Review, Vol. 50, No.1. (Feb., 1985), pp. 94-106.
[19] Massey, D. S. and Denton, N.A. (1988) “The dimensions of residential segregation”. Social Forces, Vol. 67, No.
2. (Dec., 1988), pp. 281-315.
[20] Massey, D.S. (1990) “American apartheid: Segregation and the making of the underclass”. The American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 96, No. 2 (Sep.), 329-357.
[21] Massey, D.S., A.B. Gross and M.L. Eggers 1991 “Segregation, the concentration of poverty, and the life chances
of individuals”, Social Science Research 20. (1991), pp. 397-420.
[22] Massey, D.S., Gross, A.B. and Shibuya, K. “Migration, segregation and the geographic concentration of
poverty”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 3. (Jun., 1994), pp. 425-445.
[23] Massey, D.S., White, M. J. and Phua, V. (1996) “The Dimensions of segregation revisited”, Sociological Methods
& Research, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Nov., 1996), pp. 172–206.
[24] Morrison, P.S., P. Callister and J. Rigby “The spatial separation of work–poor and work–rich households in
New Zealand 1986-2001: an introduction to a research project”. School of Earth Sciences Research Report No.
17 (Apr., 2003), New Zealand, Victoria University of Wellington.
[25] Omer., I. “Demographic Processes and Ethnic Residential Segregation”. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and
Society, Vol. 3. (1999), pp. 171-184
[26] Pollicot, M. and Weiss, H. “The dynamics of Schelling–type segregation models and a nonlinear graph Laplacian
variational problems” Advances in Applied Mathematics 27. (2001), pp. 17-40.
[27] Portugali, J. Self–organization and the city. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2000.
A SPATIALLY EXTENDED MODEL FOR RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION 17
[28] Portugali, J., Benenson, I., and Omer, I. “Spatial cognitive dissonance and sociospatial emergence in a self–
organizing city”. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 27. (1997), pp. 263-285.
[29] Savage, M. and Warde, A. (1993) Urban Sociology, Capitalism and Modernity. Houndmills: Macmillan Press,
Ltd. London.
[30] Schelling, T.C. “Models of segregation”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 59, No. 2. (May, 1969), pp.
488–493.
[31] Schelling, T.C. “Dynamic Models of Segregation”, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1 (1971), pp. 143–186.
[32] Schelling, T.C. , 1978, Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: W.W. Norton.
[33] Stears, L.B. and Logan, J.R. (1986) “The racial structuring of the housing market and segregation in suburban
area”. Social Forces, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Sep.), 28-42.
[34] Tickamyer, A. R. (2000) “Space matters Spatial Inequality in future sociology”, Contemporary Sociology, Vol.
29, No. 6 (Nov. 2000), pp. 805–813.
[35] Theil H. Economic and Information Theory. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1967.
[36] Wilson, A. (2001). Complex Spatial Systems: the modeling foundations of urban and regional analysis. England:
Pearson Education Limited. 2001.
